When presented with the option to switch to a new, lower-fee account, forty-two percent of subjects who already owned a more expensive savings account with a local bank in Malawi chose to retain it. In contrast, none of the first-time customers offered the same two options chose the more expensive account. This pattern is consistent with an "endowment effect" and can have large welfare effects: account maintenance fees will drain account balances in five months for the average subject who chooses to retain the old account. The endowment effect disappears, however, among prior account holders who had been experimentally induced to make transactions using their original accounts. Experience using financial products can thus mitigate behavioral anomalies and improve financial decision making.
Introduction
Consumers often incur costs when switching to a new product (Klemperer, 1995) . For example, clients of a cellular service provider typically pay activation fees, and users of one computer operating system face learning costs when switching to another system. These pecuniary and effort costs may lead to inaction (Burnham et al., 2003; Madrian and Shea, 2001 ), but even if they were negligible, other costs exist that are psychological in nature. Individuals tend to value items that they possess more than those that are not part of their endowment; as a result, they may fail to trade. The gap between the willingness-toaccept and the willingness-to-pay is known as the "endowment effect," and it can be explained by loss aversion-the idea that losses loom larger than equally sized gains (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979) . This empirical phenomenon has been documented both in the lab and in the field using goods ranging from mugs, chocolate bars, and sports memorabilia to houses and stock market investments (Kahneman et al., 1990; Weber and Camerer, 1998; Genesove and Mayer, 2001; Anagol et al., forthcoming; see Ericson and Fuster, 2014 for a review).
The endowment effect contradicts the assumption that preferences are independent from endowments and it may reduce welfare as individuals stick to suboptimal consumption bundles (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . It is thus important to ask whether experience can mitigate this behavioral anomaly by reducing the uncertainty that participants face when trading. Engelmann and Hollard (2010) make the useful distinction between choice and trade uncertainty. Choice uncertainty refers to the trader's uncertainty about the features of the item being traded or about any preferences toward it, while trade uncertainty concerns the process of trading itself, as individuals may overestimate the cost or risk associated with a market transaction. In their exchange experiments, the authors use well-known items (packages of rice or coffee, blank DVDs, mugs, chocolate bars, etc.) and find that experimentally reducing trade uncertainty by forcing subjects to trade during an initial stage while keeping choice uncertainty fixed, eliminates the endowment effect in a later stage of trading. In their context, choice uncertainty is perhaps less relevant because individuals are familiar with the items traded and have well-defined preferences over them. But when the item exchanged is a bank account, a product with attributes that may be difficult to understand (Giné and Mazer, 2018) , choice uncertainty may play a role in explaining the endowment effect.
In this paper, we present two groups of subjects with a choice between two savings accounts with different fee structures, both offered by a local bank. Subjects in one group already own the old, more expensive account, while the other group comprises new customers who do not own any accounts with this bank.
The existing account holders are a subset of households from 14 villages in southern Malawi who were randomly chosen to be offered fully subsidized basic savings accounts with a local bank in 2012 as part of a previous study. In 2015, households that had opened subsidized accounts were revisited and some were randomly chosen to receive a MK 25,000 (USD 67) windfall payment (see Brune et al., 2017 for details) . This transfer did not have persistent effects on savings or spending, but it did increase the number of transactions that subjects made at the bank branch. The random allocation of these transfers thus created exogenous variation in the experience households had in using their accounts.
In 2016, the previous project concluded and subsidies were discontinued. Starting in May 2016, individuals had to pay a monthly maintenance fee of MK 400 that had previously been covered by subsidies paid directly to the bank. At the same time, the bank introduced a new account, the Pafupi account. This account had no monthly fee but charged a withdrawal fee of MK 150 per transaction. In addition, the Pafupi account required the purchase of an ATM card for MK 1,300. Based on the number of transactions individuals had made until May 2016, the Pafupi accounts were less expensive than the original (basic) accounts for everyone in the sample, if their usage patterns continued and they planned to keep the account open for at least four months.
The second group, made up of new customers, was randomly selected in March 2016 from among the households in the 2012 household listing that had not been offered a subsidized account in the previous study. The final sample included the two groups, drawn from the same original household listing, with random variation in whether or not they were endowed with basic savings accounts.
In March and April 2016, the 594 households that had opened the basic account in 2012 ("old" subjects) and the 216 households that had not been offered the account in 2012 ("new" subjects) were visited at home and asked to come to the bank branch to make a decision about savings accounts. Old subjects could keep their existing basic account and start paying monthly fees, could close their basic account, or could transfer their balances to a Pafupi account with the purchase of an ATM card. New subjects could open a basic or Pafupi account, or could decline to open either account. While the Pafupi account was cheaper than the basic account given the past usage of all old subjects, the choice was presented in a neutral way.
The home visits were used to introduce randomized variation in two dimensions of the decision. First, we varied the amount of a payment for coming to the branch, which was used to encourage individuals to actively make a decision. Second, we varied the timing of when subjects were asked to visit the branch: some were asked to come within the week, and others were asked to come only after a two-week delay. This was to assess the possibility that lack of salience would cause people to fail to show up at the branch, or that costs associated with paying attention might trigger forgetfulness and adherence to the status quo, even in the absence of an endowment effect (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) . Finally, when they did visit the branch, some respondents received an unexpected extra payment in order to test whether liquidity constraints prevented individuals from purchasing the ATM card required to open the Pafupi account.
This design maintains parallels to important features of laboratory experiments that study the endowment effect. First, the cost of trading in laboratory experiments is zero. In our setting, there are time and monetary costs associated with visiting the branch, but these are equal regardless of which account is chosen, and randomly offset for some customers. There are extra up-front costs associated with opening Pafupi accounts; again, these are randomly offset for some customers. Second, subjects in laboratory experiments are explicitly prompted about whether they would like to trade. In our setting, enumerators present the different options regarding account ownership and prompt individuals to choose among them.
Our setting also has important advantages over laboratory experiments that may suffer from potential experimental confounds. Plott and Zeiler (2005, 2007) argue that when endowing subjects with an actual object such as a mug by using visual or physical cues, subjects may view the object as a gift and be unwilling to trade it, thus leading to a spurious, demandinduced endowment effect. In our context, it is unlikely that old subjects viewed the basic accounts as a gift in 2016, because four years previously they had only received technical assistance in order to open them. In addition, individuals had a longer time period-ranging from two days to two weeks-to consider their potential decisions regarding the account. In contrast, subjects in laboratory experiments typically consider these choices for no more than a few minutes.
We find evidence consistent with an endowment effect. While 56 percent of new subjects opened the Pafupi account, only 49 percent of previous account holders switched to the Pafupi account. We note that the old subjects are those who were randomly chosen to receive and accepted the offer to open an account in 2012, while the new subjects may include individuals who would have declined an offer to open an account had they received one in 2012.
1 Indeed, the two samples are different in observable and perhaps unobservable characteristics. We address this potential selection bias using three strategies. First, we control for all of the available baseline characteristics. Second, we use propensity score matching and the same rich set of covariates to find a sample of new subjects that is comparable to the old subjects sample, at least on observable characteristics. These two strategies yield endowment effects that are similar in magnitude, if not larger, than in the unadjusted specifications. Third, using the sample of new subjects, we predict the probability of opening a Pafupi account and extrapolate this probability to the sample of old subjects. We find predicted probabilities that are very similar across samples. This suggests that although the two samples are different
1 The take-up rate of account opening in the 2012 experiment was 85 percent.
on some dimensions, the relationship between observable characteristics and the predicted probabilities of opening a Pafupi account are similar, and as a result, the endowment effect cannot be explained by differences in the covariates across the two samples.
More importantly, we exploit the design of an earlier field experiment in which a random subsample of account owners received a transfer in 2015 that induced additional transactions in subsequent months. We find that the endowment effect disappears: among account holders who were induced to make more transactions, 60 percent switched to the Pafupi account.
Using the 2015 transfer as an instrument, we show that higher usage of the basic account led to not only a higher rate of Pafupi account opening but also to higher trust in the bank and to better knowledge of the features of the basic account. These results suggest that experience with the basic account reduced choice uncertainty; individuals learned about the features of the account by transacting with it and were able to compare different accounts and switch to the cheaper one when given the opportunity to do so. While choice uncertainty plays a role in explaining the endowment effect, trade uncertainty appears to be less relevant in this context, since all account holders choose between accounts at most once.
These results contribute to the literature on the endowment effect in the field (see, for example, Anagol et al., forthcoming) and in particular, on the extent to which experience can attenuate it (List, 2003 (List, , 2004 Feng and Seasholes, 2005; Dhar and Zhu, 2006; Gächter et al., 2009; Greenwood and Nagel, 2009; Seru et al., 2010; Engelmann and Hollard, 2010; List, 2011; Anagol et al., forthcoming) . Most papers in this literature, however, focus on experience gained by transacting in the market rather than by gaining familiarity with the product traded. In studying trading rates of sports memorabilia in an actual marketplace, List (2003) observed an inefficiently low number of trades by novice traders. In contrast, the endowment effect disappeared among experienced traders. List (2004) used a similar sample of novice and experienced traders in the sports card market and found that, when randomly presented with mugs and chocolate bars of equivalent value, novice traders exchanged their endowment far less often than experienced traders, indicating that previous market interaction and arbitrage opportunities might have taught experienced traders to treat the dispossession of a good as an opportunity cost rather than as a loss. One problem with List (2003 List ( , 2004 is that market experience is endogenous, so it is unclear whether experienced traders are unique, or if on the contrary, novice traders can learn to behave like experienced traders if they are induced to gain that experience. List (2011) exogenously induces a random sample of subjects to gain experience making trades in a sports card market, and finds that collectors who are induced to trade as part of the experiment are more likely to trade subsequently. Anagol et al. (forthcoming) cleverly exploit a natural experiment in which Indian initial public offering (IPO) shares are allocated to investors using a lottery. They find that winners of the lottery are significantly more likely to hold the shares than lottery losers even 24 months after the lottery. This endowment effect is partially mitigated by how actively investors trade in the market, although market experience in their context is endogenous. Using a different financial product-namely, a savings account-our results are therefore consistent with Anagol et al. (forthcoming) 's study of IPO shares.
As governments the world over try to broaden financial inclusion by providing transfers directly into the accounts of previously unbanked beneficiaries, there is a concern that individuals may not be familiar with the accounts or may end up contracting products that are not well-suited to their needs (see, e.g., Gross and Souleles, 2002; Choi et al., 2011; Duarte and Hastings, 2012; Hastings et al., 2012; Agarwal et al., 2013 Agarwal et al., , 2015 Mazer, 2018 and Campbell et al., 2011; DellaVigna, 2009 for reviews) . Some advocate financial literacy interventions, but financial education alone is often ineffective in changing financial decision making (see Cole et al., 2011 and Miller et al., 2014; Hastings et al., 2013 for reviews). Our results suggest that making payments directly into beneficiaries' accounts rather than disbursing cash can encourage individuals to actively use and gain experience with financial products. This familiarity can lead to improved financial decision making.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Sections 2 and 3 describe the experimental design and data, respectively. Section 4 describes the empirical strategy, reports results, and explores the role of account usage using IV specifications as a possible mechanism that explains the results. Section 5 provides a discussion of alternative explanations for the results, and concludes.
Experimental Design
The experiment uses two samples of individuals drawn from a sampling framework created in 2012. Subjects in the first sample were randomly selected to be offered fully subsidized savings accounts in 2012, while those in the second sample were not. In what follows, we describe in detail the two samples and an additional experiment, conducted in 2015, that induced account usage among some of the individuals who had opened accounts.
Old subjects
In July 2012, we randomly selected and interviewed 872 households from 14 villages surrounding the Mulanje market in southern Malawi.
2 All these villages are located within six kilometers of the local NBS branch. 3 These households were offered assistance with opening a basic savings account at NBS plus subsidies to cover the required minimum balance of MK 500 (USD 1.34) and the MK 400 monthly maintenance fees. Subsidies were paid directly to the bank each month so that fees were not deducted from customers' balances. The minimum balance was enforced in the sense that the bank would deny any withdrawal that would bring the balance below MK 500. This means that the account balance was always equal to or higher than MK 500. Because the bank did not charge for transactions, the basic account offered in the study was free to customers. 4 The take-up rate for these free accounts was 85 percent.
Of the 742 households that opened subsidized accounts, 600 were randomly chosen in April 2015 to participate in another field experiment that induced account usage. The experiment varied whether households received a large (MK 25,000 or about USD 67) transfer and whether this transfer was made in cash or directly deposited into subjects' accounts (see Brune et al., 2017) . The transfer increased the number of transactions that participants made at NBS. Account holders who received transfers had the same number of bank transactions in the month preceding the transfer as those who did not receive the transfer. However, transfer recipients made significantly more transactions with their accounts after receiving the transfers, even excluding initial withdrawals of the amount transferred. The increased usage began in the month following the transfers and persisted, with a cumulative average of 1.5 more deposits 12 months after the transfers. Thus, the transfer treatment provides random variation in subjects' experience using their bank accounts.
In March and April 2016, we implemented an experiment that removed the subsidy for the recurring monthly maintenance fees of the basic account and offered subjects the options of paying fees themselves, closing their accounts, or transferring their balances to a new type of account without monthly maintenance fees (the Pafupi account). Of the 742 households that opened the subsidized accounts in 2012, we were able to contact and visit 594 households in 2016; these households constitute the first sample for this experiment. During the one-onone home visits, an enumerator explained that after more than three years (since July 2012), the original research about account ownership was ending and the subsidies would stop as of Enumerators presented this choice using a neutral frame. Figure 2 shows the features of the basic and Pafupi accounts before and after May 2016. Because NBS required households to visit the branch in order to close the account or transfer the balance to a Pafupi account, the field team did not ask households to make a decision during the home visit. Rather, they asked subjects to come to the branch by the end of May 2016 to report their decision and complete the necessary paperwork.
All households received the same information but we experimentally varied two conditions related to this decision. First, we took seriously the concerns about status quo bias (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) and incentivized some individuals to visit the branch and make (and report) an active decision. These incentives were structured as flat cash payments delivered to respondents who came to the branch in the specified time window. The payment amounts were MK 0 (no payment), MK 500, or MK 1,000. We were explicit that this show-up payment was not conditional on the choice of account disposition and would be paid as long as the account holder came to the branch. The MK 500 payment was calibrated to cover the cost of round-trip bicycle taxi transportation to the branch, although the vast majority of customers in the sample chose to walk rather than pay for transport.
Second, we varied when households were asked to come to the branch. Among those offered a cash payment, half were asked to come within the following week and the other half were asked to come after a two-week waiting period. Households had to come to the bank within their scheduled window in order to receive their show-up bonus, and this was framed as a strategy for managing the flow of visitors. By timing the home visits just days before they went to the branch, these visits constituted a teachable moment, as subjects received information about account fees when that information was needed to make an informed decision. The length of the window for visiting the branch was set at one week and was the same in both cases. The delay was designed to measure the salience of the decision, as forgetful or inattentive customers might not remember to show up after a two-week delay (Bordalo et al., 2012) . This potential inattentiveness to bank accounts could explain the large number of dormant accounts in which balances are entirely depleted by monthly fees (Karlan et al., 2014) . This cross-cutting randomization resulted in five treatment groups: a no-bonus and nodate group, and four groups who could receive cash for coming to the bank within a designated window. The treatment groups are illustrated in Figure 1 . This randomization was conducted by computer and stratified by village and previous treatment assignment. Assignment 
New subjects
The second sample was selected from the same household listing conducted for the July 2012
intervention. In 2016, we randomly selected 216 households from the list of those not offered subsidized accounts in 2012. In March and April 2016, these households were visited at home and given information about opening either a basic (now unsubsidized) account or a Pafupi account. They were surveyed at the same time as households that already had accounts (old subjects) and given very similar information: In contrast, new subjects were never offered the account, so some might have declined to open subsidized accounts. The next section describes how the two samples differ, and Section 4 describes the strategies we use to address this potential selection bias.
Data
We use three sources of data. Baseline data come from the household survey administered to all households in March and April 2016. 5 Outcome data come from records collected by our field team stationed at the NBS branch during the intervention and from NBS administrative data. Panels A and B of Table 1 compare the individual characteristics and savings-related behaviors of new subjects in column (1) to existing account holders in column (2), using data from the March/April 2016 household survey. Column 3 reports the p-value of the t-test of equal means. As expected, panel A reports some differences in individual characteristics of these two samples. Account holders are more likely to be male and older than new subjects, reflecting a tendency for men to control household finances. They also have higher indices of housing quality, assets owned, and animals owned, though the values of the latter two proxies for wealth are measured less precisely and do not differ significantly across the two samples at conventional levels. Account holders own more land, though the difference is again not statistically significant.
Panel B reports characteristics related to savings behavior. Old subjects express a greater willingness to pay for an NBS account compared to new subjects. By design, these account holders are also more likely to have an NBS account and, as a result, to have higher formal savings balances, although the difference with new subjects is not statistically significant. Ex-perience with accounts seems to have tempered subjects' enthusiasm about usage as existing account holders anticipated fewer and smaller transactions than predicted by new subjects.
Past and predicted usage is still too limited to make the basic account worthwhile given the fee structure. In fact, all subjects would pay lower fees with a Pafupi account if they planned to keep it for four months or more. According to their expected use in the three months after the baseline survey, new subjects would save an average of MK 909 by choosing a Pafupi account instead of a basic account, while existing account holders would save MK 1,067, even after accounting for the cost of the ATM card. Table 1 also reports the p-value of the F-test that all variables are jointly zero in a regression with "new subject" as the dependent variable. In both panels A and B the p-value is 0.00, suggesting that the samples of new and old subjects differ on observable characteristics. The next section describes two different ways to address the potential selection problem.
Columns 4-7 of Table 1 compare the baseline characteristics of existing account holders who were assigned to the three different treatments in the transfer experiment: a control group (column 4), a transfer in cash (column 2), or a transfer directly deposited into the individual's account (column 3). We report the p-value of the joint test of equal means across all three categories in column 7. Owing to the randomization, we do not expect (and do not observe) differences in household characteristics such as age or gender of the respondent, or household size. In principle, the transfer treatment could have affected asset ownership, but it does not appear to have done so. The p-value of the F-test that all characteristics in panel A are jointly zero is 0.882. In panel B, respondents who received transfers via direct deposit expressed greater willingness to pay for savings accounts (column 6), although the joint test is not statistically significant at conventional levels (the p-value is 0.124). Households that received the transfer did not expect more withdrawals in the next three months compared to those who did not receive the transfer. The p-value of the F-test is 0.145.
Panel C of Table 1 reports administrative outcomes, which are only available for old subjects. Of note, households that received large transfers made more transactions in the six months following receipt. with a basic account, and visiting the branch and leaving with a Pafupi account. We note that the default option for both new and old subjects is different, although their choice set is similar. For existing account holders (old subjects), the default was owning a basic account;
for new subjects, the default was not opening an NBS account. We find that 42 percent of old subjects kept the basic account, either because they did not visit the branch or because they visited it to collect the show-up fee but chose to retain the existing account. None of the new subjects opened the basic, more expensive account. Relatedly, old subjects might have had more of an incentive to visit the branch as they could close the account and collect the MK 500 minimum balance. Consistent with this, we find that 75 percent of old subjects visited the branch, compared to 66 percent of new subjects. Finally, for both old and new subjects, owning a Pafupi account required an active choice as well as the purchase of the ATM card and the completion of the required account-opening forms. We find that 49 percent of old subjects opened a Pafupi account, compared to 56 percent of new subjects.
The following section describes the empirical strategy used to assess the impact of the different treatments and the role of an existing account holder.
Empirical strategy and results
Because the various treatments were assigned randomly, the impact of the 2012, 2015, and 2016 treatments on the main outcomes of interest can be estimated via the following regression:
where Y contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey and will be included in some specifications to control for observable preexisting differences. The constant α may be replaced by village fixed effects α v in some specifications, and iv is a mean-zero error term.
Since treatment assignment is done at the individual level, we report robust standard errors.
We consider two main outcomes of interest Y iv : whether participants visited the bank to report their decision about the accounts and whether they opened a new Pafupi account.
These outcomes are chosen because they are not the default choice of either sample. Overall, 72 percent visited the bank branch and 51 percent opened Pafupi accounts.
The coefficient β O captures the endowment effect when the outcome is opening a Pafupi account. The coefficients β T and β D D capture the attenuating effects of the transfer and of whether it was directly deposited into the account. When the outcome is opening a Pafupi account, a lower probability of switching to a cheaper Pafupi account β O < 0 is evidence of an endowment effect. In addition, β T > 0 indicates that induced account usage makes individuals treat the account as an opportunity cost rather than a loss, and therefore mitigates the endowment effect. Table 3 analyzes the determinants of visiting the NBS branch during the required time window.
6 Visiting the branch is a necessary condition for opening a Pafupi account for both samples. For old subjects it is also a proxy for attentiveness toward the decision about the basic account; account holders can collect the balance of at least MK 500 by coming to the branch and closing the account. In column 1, old subjects are nine percentage points more likely to visit the bank branch, compared to a base of 66 percent among new subjects. In column 2, we see that this result is driven by existing account holders who received the transfer in the 2015 experiment, and in particular those who received the transfer via direct deposit. The p-value of the t-test that old subjects with the transfer in cash have the same probability of visiting the branch as new subjects is 0.10. The p-value of the t-test comparing account holders who received transfers via direct deposit to new subjects is 0.00. Note that panel C of Table 2 shows that prior account holders have roughly the same balance in the account. Therefore, the same amount could potentially be depleted by monthly maintenance fees, regardless of whether these account holders received the transfer in 2015.
Offering a show-up bonus of MK 500 for visiting the branch during the prespecified oneweek window increased the probability of visiting the branch by 26 percentage points. 7 The marginal effect of the higher show-up bonus of MK 1,000 relative to the MK 500 show-up bonus is statistically significant but only one-third as large. The impact of the show-up bonuses is as prevalent in subjects who received the 2015 transfer as in those who did not.
When we interact the show-up bonus dummy B iv with the transfer dummy T iv , the coefficient is negative and not statistically significant (results not shown).
We find no evidence of inattentiveness, as delaying the window to visit the branch by two weeks has no impact on the respondent's probability of visiting the branch. As expected, the extra cash offered at the branch also has no effect on the probability of visiting the branch since individuals were not aware of this extra windfall when they decided to visit the branch.
Finally, the results in column 3 suggest that the decision to visit the branch is not driven by baseline characteristics since their inclusion does not affect the coefficients, compared to those in column 2. 9,10 A high showup bonus also increases the probability of opening a Pafupi account, but this effect operates through increasing the probability of visiting the bank rather than through relaxing a binding liquidity constraint. The additional cash bonus at the branch does not affect the probability of opening a Pafupi account, even though the purchase of an ATM card is required and could be paid for with the unanticipated large payment.
Despite the baseline differences between new and old subjects reported in Table 1 Table 4 do not include village fixed effects. We report the estimates using village fixed effects in Table A3 and results are virtually the same.
9 Interestingly, new subjects who opened an NBS account on their own were as likely as those without a prior account to open a new Pafupi account. This suggests that new subjects do not exhibit an endowment effect. Perhaps their experience and use of the unsubsidized NBS accounts prior to the home visit led them to make the right choice regarding the Pafupi account. See Section 5 for a discussion of why the transfer mitigates the endowment effect.
10 The effect of direct deposit of the 2015 transfer is not statistically significant, and the p-value for the comparison between account holders who received their transfer via direct deposit and new customers is 0.68.
(by 7.6 percentage points, p=0.23) than new customers to open Pafupi accounts. Column 4 of Table 4 further addresses the potential selection problem in the sample of old subjects by using propensity score matching methods to find a comparable sample of old and new subjects, based on the baseline characteristics reported in Table 1 .
11 Column 4 reports even stronger evidence of an endowment effect among the matched sample of old subjects who did not receive transfers in 2015. Finally, Appendix Table A4 explores potential selection another way. Using the sample of new NBS customers only, we regress Pafupi account openings against all of the covariates in X iv . We then use the estimated coefficients to predict the take-up of the Pafupi account for both new and old subjects. In column 1 of Appendix Table A4 we regress this predicted probability against the Old iv dummy and the rest of the experimental treatment dummies used in Table 4 . We find that the coefficient on Old iv is small and statistically insignificant, suggesting that while the samples of old and new subjects may be different on observable characteristics, the expected probability of opening a Pafupi account is on average the same.
In column 2, we use the difference between this predicted probability and the actual dummy for whether the Pafupi account was opened, and find that the coefficient on Old iv is negative and significant. This suggests that the lower rate of account opening among old subjects is not driven by differences in observable characteristics.
We conclude from columns 1-4 of Table 4 and Appendix Table A4 that the behavior of old subjects is consistent with an endowment effect and that the transfer eliminates it.
Column 5 of Table 4 restricts the sample to subjects who visited the NBS branch. We note that visiting the branch is an endogenous decision, so this specification is included only as suggestive evidence. Existing account holders are 25.4 percentage points less likely to open Pafupi accounts than are new subjects, conditional on visiting the branch. In this specification, the endowment effect is only partially mitigated by the transfer. The intuition for why the endowment effect is still present is that in this selected sample, a significant number of individuals who visited the branch may have been more interested in collecting the show-up bonus than in making a decision about the accounts.
Alternatively, in column 6 of Table 4 , we present results from an IV specification where 11 In particular, we use LASSO to select the covariates in X iv that best predict if customers are in the sample of old (or new) subjects. We then use the vector of covariates in X iv selected by LASSO to estimate a propensity score. Column 4 restricts the sample to individuals who share a common support in terms of the propensity score. By construction, new and existing account holders in this matched sample are comparable in observable characteristics. When regressing Old iv against the covariates selected and dummies for each of the propensity score bins, the p-value of the F-test that all variables are jointly equal to zero is 0.204. the instruments for visiting the branch are indicators for the show-up bonus, high showup bonus, and delayed visit treatments. Accounting for endogeneity in the probability of visiting the branch, existing account holders are 16.8 percentage points less likely to switch to a Pafupi account, and the transfer offsets over half the endowment effect by increasing take-up by 10.5 percentage points. Table 5 explores the relationship between anticipated use and subjective valuation of basic accounts, and take-up of the Pafupi account.
12 Columns 1 and 2 consider the number of withdrawals that subjects anticipate making in the three months following the survey. Table 1 reports that prior account holders have greater willingness to pay on average, and column 4 of Table 5 suggests that those more likely to open a Pafupi account are the existing account holders with higher willingness to pay (the p-value that willingness to pay (WTP) + Old subject x WTP = 0 is 0.003, not shown in Table 5 ).
Mechanisms
The previous section documents a gap in the willingness to open a Pafupi account between old and new subjects, and it shows that this gap closes when old subjects are induced to use the account. We now explore why usage may close this gap, using receipt of the 2015 transfer as an instrument for account usage. In this analysis, we restrict the sample to old subjects as only they were included in the transfer experiment. The first stage is:
The measure of transactions includes deposits and withdrawals made beginning one week after the transfer in order to avoid capturing any mechanical effect of directly deposited amounts into the account. We report estimates of the first stage in (2) for six and 12 months after the transfers were made. 14 First-stage results are reported in columns 1 and 5 of Table 6 . The transfer significantly increased the number of transactions using basic accounts in both time periods; the effect is cumulative and the result is an average increase of 1.5 transactions 12 months after the transfer, or 47 percent relative to the 3.2 transactions in the control group (column 5). The effect of the transfer on the number of transactions, while monotonically increasing, becomes less precise estimated over time. The F-statistic for the first-stage regression exceeds the rule-of-thumb threshold for the six-month period (F-stat is 10.57) but not the 12-month period (F-stat is 7.42).
We run the following IV specification:
where Y iv is a dummy that takes value 1 if individual i in village v switches to a Pafupi account, trusts the NBS branch, or knows the maintenance fees of the basic account.
Our preferred specification in Table 6 considers cumulative transactions six months after the transfer (columns 2-4) as the endogenous variable, since the 12-month period (columns 6-8) may suffer from a weak instruments problem. The IV results reported in column 2 indicate that each additional induced transaction in the six months following the large cash transfer increased the probability of switching to a Pafupi account by 18 percentage points.
Column 3 shows that each additional transaction increases the probability that the individual trusts the branch by 5.6 percentage points. In column 4, each additional transaction increases the probability of correctly recalling the monthly maintenance fees of a basic account by 3.9
percentage points from a base of 6.4 percent in the control group. Columns 5-8 report the first-stage and IV estimates for the effect of transactions in the 12-month period. The results are similar to those in columns 1-4 but somewhat weaker.
Appendix Table A6 addresses concerns about the possibility of bias due to weak instruments by reporting results using Limited Information Maximum Likelihood estimation, which is thought to be more robust to the presence of weak instruments (Imbens and Wooldridge, 2007) . The specification in even-numbered columns of Appendix Table A6 includes First, enumerators told individuals that the reason why subsidies were no longer available was because the previous research project (which was also responsible for the transfers) was coming to a close. It is thus unlikely that they were expecting future transfers. Second, as the choice of accounts was presented in a neutral manner, the probability of a transfer should only depend on keeping an account open, regardless of whether it was a basic or Pafupi account. While only nine percent of old subjects closed the basic account, those who received the transfer were not less likely to close it compared to those who did not receive it (the p-value of the test that the probability of closing the account is the same in both groups is 0.990).
Alternatively, account holders who received the transfer may have switched to the Pafupi account because they expected to make fewer withdrawals and thus correctly identified the Pafupi account as being more suited to their needs. But column 2 of Table 5 and panel B
of Table 1 show that account holders who received the transfer expected to make a similar number of withdrawals in the three months following the survey compared to those who did not receive the transfer; there was no difference in expected use correlated with receipt of the transfer. Moreover, using subjects' own expectations, the Pafupi account would be less expensive than the ordinary account for all subjects in the sample, if they maintained the account for at least four months after subsidies ended. Thus, even if subjects had different expectations about future account use, expectations could not explain why old subjects who did not receive the transfer preferred the basic account to the Pafupi account.
Our results are not consistent with the predictions of other theories that are compatible with the endowment effect, either. Beggan (1992) develops a theory that suggests that there is no special "loss" for giving up an endowed item. Instead, ownership creates an endowment effect by changing the perceived utility it generates. Similarly, Carmon et al. (2003) argue that close consideration of the features of an item can induce an attachment generated by psychological proximity or by how long or intensely one thinks about its features. The endowment effect arises because people dislike breaking attachments. According to these theories, high-use (experienced) account holders would be more attached to the account and have higher willingness to pay for it compared to low-use account holders. As a result, they would be less likely to switch accounts, which is the opposite of what we find. Bordalo et al. (2012) suggest that the endowment effect is based on salience. In their model, ownership of an item makes individuals focus on its attributes, which then become salient in the owner's mind. This explanation is not consistent with the design or results of our study. First, we were careful to incentivize everyone to think about the financial decision so the product was salient for everyone. Second, we find no effect of delaying the visit to the branch by two weeks. Finally, inaction (Samuelson and Zeckhauser, 1988) cannot explain the results because we explicitly incentivize all study participants to make an active decision about their accounts and we find that the endowment effect disappears among individuals induced to use their accounts.
Policymakers frequently consider competing policies to broaden financial inclusion by devoting resources to financial literacy campaigns or by subsidizing accounts. Our resultsat least initially-suggest that making transfers directly into the accounts of individuals may be beneficial as these deposits induce account holders to transact, and the resulting familiarity with the account will raise financial awareness and improve financial decision making. Notes: This table compares existing account holders to new subjects using data from the March/April 2016 household survey. Column 1 shows summary statistics for new subjects and column 2 shows the same statistics for existing account holders. Column 3 shows the p-value of the mean comparison of means in columns 1 and 2. In column 4, we present summary statistics of existing account holders in the control group, while columns 5 and 6 show the numbers for existing account holders who received the windfall transfer in cash and direct deposit, respectively. In column 7, we show the p-values of a joint null test when regressing the relevant variable against dummies for each of the 3 groups of account holders (control, cash, and direct deposit). Panel A has summary statistics for individual characteristics, while in panel B we show means and SDs of variables that capture individual savings behavior.
Figures and Tables
At the end of each panel, we show a p-value of joint orthogonality tests. In columns 1 and 2, we regress a dummy for new clients against all the characteristics in each panel and report the p-value of a joint F-test that all coefficients are equal to zero. In column 7, the last row corresponds to the p-value of a similar test for a multinomial logit aggregating all 3 groups of existing account holders. See Appendix Table A1 for definition of each variable. 
where Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The vector X i contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term.Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who visited the NBS branch and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. When indicated, covariates are male, HH size, age, education of HH head, housing quality score, asset score, animal score, acres owned, number of informal savings strategies, total value of informal savings, number of deposits into informal savings, number of formal savings accounts, total value of formal savings accounts, and number of deposits into formal savings accounts. Columns 1-5 are OLS regressions. In column 4, we use a sample matched on observable characteristics selected by a LASSO model among X i , restricting to the common support of the estimated propensity score. In column 5, the sample is restricted to individuals who made a visit to the branch. Column 6 is a 2SLS regression, using 2016 treatments as instruments for visiting the bank branch. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus. 
where Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the large transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the large transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The vector X i contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term. Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. In column 1, we also include EW iv , the number of withdrawals a individual expects to make in the following 3 months. In column 2, we include EW iv and its interaction with Old. In column 3, we include individual willingness to pay for a NBS account in MK 1,000s (WTP and 6-8 report IV results, instrumenting for the number of transactions six (columns 2-4) or 12 (columns 6-8) months following the transfer with an indicator for receiving the transfer. In columns 2 and 6, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. In columns 3 and 7, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who reported trusting NBS and 0 otherwise. In columns 4 and 8, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who correctly reported that regular fees are between MK 350 and MK 450 and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus. See Appendix Table A1 for definition of each variable.
Appendix Table A1 Number of deposits to formal savings (previous month) Number of deposits made to any formal savings account or instrument in the month prior to baseline interview
Number of transactions (6 months, administrative data) Total number of transactions made by an individual in the 6 months following the windfall transfer (starting one week after the transfer)
Number of transactions (12 months, administrative data) Total number of transactions made by an individual in the 12 months following the windfall transfer (starting one week after the transfer)
Appendix Table A2 : Determinants of visiting the NBS branch (with village fixed effects) Notes: In this table we show estimates of the following specification:
where Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The vector Xi contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term. Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who visited the NBS branch and 0 otherwise. We also include village fixed effects in all regressions. When indicated, covariates are male, HH size, age, education of HH head, housing quality score, asset score, animal score, acres owned, number of informal savings strategies, total value of informal savings, number of deposits into informal savings, number of formal savings accounts, total value of formal savings accounts, and number of deposits into formal savings accounts. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus.
Appendix Table A3 : Determinants of owning a Pafupi account (with village fixed effects) 
where Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The vector X i contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term.Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who visited the NBS branch and 0 otherwise. Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. We also include village fixed effects in all regressions. When indicated, covariates are male, HH size, age, education of HH head, housing quality score, asset score, animal score, acres owned, number of informal savings strategies, total value of informal savings, number of deposits into informal savings, number of formal savings accounts, total value of formal savings accounts, and number of deposits into formal savings accounts. Columns 1-5 are OLS regressions. In column 4, we use a sample matched on observable characteristics selected by a LASSO model among X i , restricting to the common support of the estimated propensity score. In column 5, the sample is restricted to individuals who made a visit to the branch. Column 6 is a 2SLS regression, using 2016 treatments as instruments for visiting the bank branch. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus.
Appendix 
Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term. In column 1, the dependent variable is the predicted probability of opening the Pafupi account, estimated using the sample of new NBS customers and covariates in X i v selected by a LASSO model. In column 2, the dependent variable is the residual of the estimation of the same probability. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus.
where Old is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual is an existing NBS account holder; T is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the large transfer treatment in 2012; DD is a dummy if the large transfer was directly deposited into the account; B (HB) is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual was promised a show-up bonus of MK 500 (MK 1,000) for visiting the bank; D is a dummy that takes value 1 if the one-week window to visit the bank was delayed by three weeks; and AB is a dummy that takes value 1 if the individual received the extra cash during the branch visit. The vector X i contains individual-level covariates measured during the 2016 survey. The variable iv is a mean-zero error term. Dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. We also include village fixed effects in all regressions. In column 1, we also include EW iv , the number of withdrawals a individual expects to make in the following 3 months. In column 2, we include EW iv and its interaction with Old. In column 3, we include individual willingness to pay for a NBS account in MK 1,000s (WTP). Finally, in column 4, we include the WTP and the interaction between the WTP and Old subject. OLS regressions. Robust standard errors. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. Control group corresponds to new subjects offered no show-up bonus. See Appendix Table A1 for definition of each variable. Y iv = γ + ωNumber of transactions iv + iv , where the number of transactions made by a existing account holder in columns 1 and 3 is instrumented with the large windfall transfer made in 2012, while in columns 2 and 4 we also use the direct deposit as instrument. In panel A, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who opened Pafupi accounts and 0 otherwise. In panel B, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who reported trusting NBS and 0 otherwise. In panel C, the dependent variable equals 1 for respondents who correctly reported that regular fees are between MK 350 and MK 450 per month, and 0 otherwise. Robust standard errors clustered at the village level. Anderson-Rubin confidence intervals calculated from condivreg in Stata 14. * p<0.10, ** p<0.05, *** p<0.01. See Appendix Table A1 for definition of each variable.
Appendix

Appendix: Experimental scripts A Returning Control Subjects
Read: Thank you for participating in our program. After two years, our research project is close to finishing. NBS usually charges fees of MK 400 per month for the type of savings account you have. The research project has been paying those fees on your behalf since you opened the account. Now, that subsidy is ending. Starting in May, we will no longer pay your account fees. That means that NBS will begin to deduct MK 400 from your balance every month. If your balance gets below MK 500, NBS will close the account. If you close your account before May 15th, no fees will be deducted. You need to visit the bank to close the account. After you close the account, you will receive any money that was in your account.
Read: Zikomo kwambiri pakutenga nawo mbali mukafukufuku wathu. Patadutsa zaka ziwiri, kafukufuku wathu akupita kumapeto. NBS imadula ndalama ya pa mwezi yokwana MK 400 mwezi uli wonse pa mtundu wa akaunti mulinayoyi. Ngati mbali yaka fukufuku wathu tankhala tikukupelekerani ndalama imeneyi mmalo mwanu kuchokera nthawi imene tinakutsekulirani akauntiyi. Tsopano, kukulipirirani ndalama kumeneku tikusiya. Kuyambira mwezi wa May sitidzakulipiriraninso ndalama imene NBS imadula pa mwezi. Kutanthawuza kuti NBS idzayamba kukudulani ndalama yokwana MK 400 pa ndalama yanu yotsala mu akaunti mwanu mwezi uliwonse. Ngati ndalama yotsala idzachepele MK500, NBS idzatseka akaunti yanu. Ngati mutseke akaunti yanu pasanafike pa15 May, palibe ndalama ili yonse imene itadzadulidwe. Mukuyenera kupita ku banki kukatseka akaunti yanu. Mukamaliza zonse zofunikira kutseka akaunti yanu, adzakupatsani ndalama yanu yonse imene inatsala mu akaunti mwanu.-You have three choices. The first option is to keep your account, and pay the fees. You could still keep money in your account, and make withdrawals and deposits without paying anything extra. Make sure that your balance does not get below MK 500, because then NBS would close your account. If you choose this option, you do not need to do anything. Your account will stay open, but fees will be deducted starting in May.
Muli ndi zisankho zitatu. choyamba, ndi kusungabe akaunti yanu ndikumapitiliza kulipira ndalama ya pa mwezi. mukhonza kumasungitsabe ndalama mu akaunti yanu, ndikupatapa, kusunga osalipira kena kalikonse kapamwamba. Mungowonetsetsa kuti ndalama yotsala mu akaunti yanu isachepele MK 500 chifukwa ikatero ndekuti NBS idzatseka akaunti yanu.
Mukasankha chisankho choyambachi simukuyenera kuchita chili chonse. akaunti yanu idzakhalabe ikugwirabe ntchito, koma kuyambira mu mwezi wa May NBS idzayamba kumakudulani ndalama yapa mwezi.
The second option is to close your account. So long as you close your account before May 15th, no fees will be deducted. You need to visit the bank to close the account. Someone from IPA will be at the branch until May 15th to help you with the paperwork. After you close the account, you will receive any money that was in your account.
Chachiwiri ndi kutseka akaunti yanu. Pokha pokha ngati mwatseka akaunti yanu pasanafike pa May 15, NBS sidzakudulani ndalama yapamwezi. Mukuyenera kudzapita ku banki kukatseketsa akaunti yanu. Mmodzi mwa wogwira naye ntchito azidzakhala panja pa NBS banki mpaka pa 15 May kudzakuthandizani. Mukadzamaliza zonse, muzalandira ndalama yonse imene inatsala mu akaunti. Chisankho cha chitatu ndi kusinthira ku mtundu wina wa akaunti. NBS posachedwapa inayambitsa mtundu wa akaunti wina wotchedwa Pafupi. Akaunti imeneyi, simakhala ndi ndalama yodulidwa pa mwezi, koma pali ndalama imene amadula ukamagwiritsa ntchito.
Mukasintha kupita ku akaunti imeneyi pasanafike pa 15 May, simuzadulidwa ndalama ya pa mwezi chifukwa chosunga ndalama ku banki. Komabe muzadulidwa MK150 nthawi iliyonse muzikatapa ndalama ku akauntiyi. Mukhozabe kuzasintha patadutsa pa 15 May, koma dziwani kuti NBS izakudulani ndalama ya pa mwezi mpaka mutazamaliza zonse zofunikira kusintha akaunti. Ngati mukufuna kusinthira ku Pafupi akaunti, mukuyenera kubwera ku banki. Mudzapeleka MK200 kuti mutsekure akaunti ya pafupi, ndikupereka MK1,100 ya khadi ya ATM yomagwiritsira ntchito. Ndipo m'modzi mwa ogwira naye ntchito wochokera ku IPA azakhala ali kumeneko mpaka pa 15 May kuti akuthandizeni. Muli ndi zisankho zitatu. choyamba, ndi kusungabe akaunti yanu ndikumapitiliza kulipira ndalama ya pa mwezi. mukhonza kumasungitsabe ndalama mu akaunti yanu, ndikupatapa, kusunga osalipira kena kalikonse kapamwamba. Mungowonetsetsa kuti ndalama yotsala mu akaunti yanu isachepele MK 500 chifukwa ikatero ndekuti NBS idzatseka akaunti yanu.
The second option is to close your account. So long as you close your account before May 15th, no fees will be deducted. You need to visit the bank to close the account. Someone from IPA will be at the branch to help you with the paperwork. After you close the account, you will receive any money that was in your account.
Mukasintha kupita ku akaunti imeneyi pasanafike pa 15 May, simuzadulidwa ndalama ya pa mwezi chifukwa chosunga ndalama ku banki. Komabe muzadulidwa MK150 nthawi iliyonse muzikatapa ndalama ku akauntiyi. Mukhozabe kuzasintha patadutsa pa 15 May, koma dziwani kuti NBS izakudulani ndalama ya pa mwezi mpaka mutazamaliza zonse zofunikira kusintha akaunti. Ngati mukufuna kusinthira ku Pafupi akaunti, mukuyenera kubwera ku banki. Mudzapeleka MK200 kuti mutsekure akaunti ya pafupi, ndikupereka MK1,100 ya khadi ya ATM yomagwiritsira ntchito. Ndipo m'modzi mwa ogwira naye ntchito wochokera ku IPA azakhala ali kumeneko mpaka pa 15 May kuti akuthandizeni.
We will give you a cash payment of MK YYYY (individual fee) in cash if you visit the IPA staff person at the NBS branch starting XXX. You will have 5 business days (days that the branch is open) to visit starting XXX. You should arrive in the morning. You do not have to make any changes to your account to get this payment. We will give you the cash even if you come to the branch but do not make any changes to your account. But, the IPA employee will be happy to help you with the paperwork at that time if you want to close or change your account. To get the payment, you have to come yourself, not send someone on your behalf. You also have to come during your appointment window, not before or after. If you come at another time, you will not get the payment.
Tidzakupatsani ndalama yokwana MK YYYY (individual fee) pa manja ngati mudzafike pa NBS kwa m'modzi mwa amene tikugwira naye ntchito kuyambira pa XXX. Muli ndi masiku 5 ogwira ntchito amene bulanchi imakhala yotsegula kuti muzapite ku banki. Ndipo muzapite m'mawa. Simukuyenera kusintha china chilichonse pa akaunti yanu kuti mulandire ndalama imeneyi. Tidzakupasani ndalama pa manja ngakhale mutabwera ku bulanchi koma osadzasintha chilichonse ku akaunti yanu. Kuti mulandire ndalama imeneyi mukuyenera kuzabwera nokha, osatuma wina m'malo mwanu. Mukuyenera kuzabwera nthawi imene munauzidwa, musazachedwe kapena kufulumira. Mukazabwera nthawi ina, simuzalandira ndalamayi.
Please consider these options, and then decide what is best for you.
Ok. Then, I would like to know a little bit about your plan. You can change your mind, but knowing your plan helps us prepare the paperwork to make the process easier for you.
Please tell me what you expect to do. Will you visit the bank, or no?
Chonde tengani nthawi yanu poganizira zisankho zanu. Muli ndi funso? ( pause)
Chabwino. tsopano, ndikufuna kudziwa pang'ono za ma pulani anu. Mukhonza kusintha maganizo, kungoti kudziwa ma pulani anu kutithandiza kuti tikonzekere kudzakuthandizani mosavuta. Chonde ndiwuzeni chimene mukuwona kuti mupanga? Kodi mupita ku banki kapena ayi?
C New Treatment Subjects Chisankho choyamba ndi kutsegula savings akaunti ndikumadulidwa ndalama yokwana MK400 mwezi ulionse. Mukhoza kumasunga ndalama mu akaunti yanuyi ndi kumatapa kapena kuyika opanda kudulidwa ndalama ina yowonjezera. Munguonetsetsa kuti ndalama yotsala mu akaunti mwanu isachepele MK500, chifukwa chakuti NBS izatseka akaunti yanu.
Ngati musankhe chisankho chimenechi mukuyenera kuzapita ku NBS. M'modzi mwa wogwira naye ntchito azakuthandizani kapangidwe kake. Komabe muzidulidwa MK150 nthawi ina iliyonse mwatapa ndalama mu akauntiyi. Ngati mukufuna kutsegula akaunti ya Pafupi, mukuyenera kufika ku NBS. Mudzapeleka MK200 kuti mutsekure akaunti ya pafupi, ndikupereka MK1,100 ya khadi ya ATM yomagwiritsira ntchito. M'modzi mwa wogwira naye ntchito azakuthandizani kapangidwe kake.
We Tidzakupatsani ndalama yokwana MK YYYY (individual fee) pa manja ngati mudzafike pa NBS kwa m'modzi mwa amene tikugwira naye ntchito kuyambira pa XXX. Muli ndi masiku 5 ogwira ntchito amene bulanchi imakhala yotsegula kuti muzapite ku banki kuyambira XXX mudzafike ku m'mawa. Simukuyenera kutsekura akaunti kuti mulandire ndalama imeneyi. Tidzakupasani ndalama pa manja ngakhale mutabwera ku bulanchi osatsekura akaunti. Kuti mulandire ndalama imeneyi mukuyenera kuzabwera nokha, osatuma wina m'malo mwanu. Mukuyenera kuzabwera nthawi imene mwauzidwa, musazachedwe kapena kufulumira. Mukazabwera nthawi ina, simuzalandira ndalamayi.
Please consider these options, and then decide whether a savings account is right for you.
Please tell me what you expect to do. Will you visit the bank, or no? Chonde tengani nthawi yanu poganizira zisankho zanu.Muli ndi funso? ( pause)
